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Abstract

White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly does not have a Ph.D. in history, although he does have two master’s
degrees, in Strategic Studies (from the National Defense University) and in National Security Affairs from the
Georgetown School of Foreign Service. So perhaps it was simply that he believed what he said about the Civil
War this past Monday on Laura Ingraham’s new Fox News ‘Ingraham Angle’ was so innocuous that he could
also believe that it wouldn’t even become a blip on anyone’s radar screen. (excerpt)
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Honor and Compromise, and Getting History
Right
Allen Guelzo
How the media’s attacks on John F. Kelly’s Civil War comments missed the mark by a mile.
White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly does not have a Ph.D. in history, although he does
have two master’s degrees, in Strategic Studies (from the National Defense University) and in
National Security Affairs from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. So perhaps it was
simply that he believed what he said about the Civil War this past Monday on Laura Ingraham’s
new Fox News ‘Ingraham Angle’ was so innocuous that he could also believe that it wouldn’t
even become a blip on anyone’s radar screen.

He could not have been more wrong. Asked for comment on the decision of Christ Episcopal
Church in Alexandria, Virginia, to remove two identifying plaques, marking pews occupied by
George Washington and Robert E. Lee, Kelly responded, “Robert E. Lee was an honorable
man.” When Lee resigned his commission as the colonel of the 1st U.S. Cavalry in April 1861
and accepted a general’s commission in the service of the breakaway Southern Confederacy,
Kelly added, he was simply acting in defense of his native state of Virginia. “He was a man that
gave up his country to fight for his state, which 150 years ago was more important than country.
It was always loyalty to state first back in those days. Now it’s different today.”
But Kelly didn’t stop there. He went on to add that the reason “an honorable man” found it
necessary to make such a decision in the first place was because of the bungling of woodenheaded politicians. The Civil War was triggered by what Kelly called “the lack of an ability to
compromise… and men and women of good faith on both sides made their stand where their
conscience had them make their stand.”
This touched off not only political fire—that Kelly would seem to be justifying the man who,
especially since the August 12th riot in Charlottesville, has become a symbol for the American
Left of much that is repugnant in American life—but historical fire as well. After all, Kelly was
describing as “honorable” an American soldier who raised his hand against his own flag, and in
defense of a cause that placed the slavery of 3.9 million African Americans among its principal
reasons for fighting. Both CNN and the Washington Post rushed to enlist commentary from
prominent academic historians, condemning Kelly’s remarks. Juana Summers, writing for CNN
Politics, cited African American historian Edna Greene Medford and the president of the
American Historical Association, James Grossman, who criticized Kelly as “just too simplistic.”
Grossman particularly scorned Kelly’s comments on “lack of an ability to compromise” as
“fantasies.” Grossman asked, “What compromise was available once states had made it clear that
they would secede from any nation that would interfere with their right to own human beings?
Prolonging the enslavement of those people?”
The Washington Post turned to Yale’s David Blight and Columbia’s Stephanie McCurry for
even more stringent criticisms of Kelly. McCurry accused Kelly of promoting a ‘Lost Cause’
view of the Civil War, a version of the war’s origins which insisted that state rights or tariffs or
resistance to centralized government was the “real” Southern motive for secession and the war
that followed, rather than the defense of slavery. “What’s so strange about this statement is how
closely it tracks or resembles the view of the Civil War that the South had finally got the nation
to embrace by the early 20th century,” she said. “It’s the Jim Crow version of the causes of the
Civil War. I mean, it tracks all of the major talking points of this pro-Confederate view of the
Civil War.” McCurry professed incredulity at Kelly’s naivety. “It was not about slavery, it was
about honorable men fighting for honorable causes?” McCurry said. “Well, what was the cause?
[…] The reason there was no compromise possible was that people in the country could not
agree over the wisdom of the continued and expanding enslavement of millions of African
Americans.”
Simplification is the bane of good history. Unfortunately, simplification is what the 24/7 mediacycle feeds upon, and it did not take long before the comments were subjected to the most dreary

and hyper-compressed of conclusions, starting with the New York Times editorial board, which
fatuously declaimed that Kelly’s “central message is, ‘Racists, we’re your guys.’”
If so, there have been a lot more “racists” in the fields of historical academe than we ever dreamt.
The great Allan Nevins, whose multi-volume Ordeal of the Union series dominated the field of
Civil War history in the era of the Civil War Centennial, entitled one of the chapters in The
Emergence of Lincoln, “The Failure of Compromise.” Nevins described “the thinking” of North
and South alike as “largely irrational, governed by subconscious memories, frustrated desires,
and the distortions of politicians and editors.”
Nor was it the Lost Cause mythmakers who invented the idea that the war was caused by a
“blundering generation” of politicians. That was the argument of Progressive historians of the
generation preceding Nevins. As James Garfield Randall (whose textbook on the Civil War era
was the standard in college classrooms until the 1980s) wrote, “To suppose that the Union could
not have been continued or slavery outmoded without the war and without the corrupt
concomitants of the war, is hardly an enlightened assumption.” Instead, the American mind of
the 1860s became “a sorry mélange of party bile, crisis melodrama, inflated eloquence, unreason,
religious fury, self-righteous, unctuous self-deception and hate”—somewhat like the New York
Times editorial board. Northerners, Randall believed, were particularly prone to be obdurate
because they regarded “war as an elemental, purifying force”—in much the same way that it
appears Kelly’s critics would like to regard the Civil War.
The fundamental problem lies in the word compromise. After all, in her 2012 book, Confederate
Reckoning, McCurry herself described the rush to Southern secession as leaving Southern
Unionists with “no power to deliver the compromise necessary” to “hold their states back from
the precipice of secession.” The real objection seems to be that anyone today should ever
imagine that there was anything about slavery that could be the basis of compromise—which is,
in itself, an uncompromising position and, presumably, an example of what Kelly was talking
about. The 750,000 soldiers who died in the war might have had something to say about the
desirability of compromise, but their voices have long since been stilled.
There were, in fact, numerous proposals for compromise on offer during the nervous “secession
winter” of 1860-61, two of them hatched in Congress: the Crittenden Compromise of December
18, 1860, and the Washington Peace Convention (February 4-27, 1861). But both of them fell
colossally flat. Why? Partly because when Southerners spoke of “compromise,” what they really
meant was “concession,” especially the concession of a federal slave code that would nationalize
legalized slavery across most of the nation.
But another aspect of the problem was that Northerners, including Abraham Lincoln, simply
could not believe that the South wasn’t simply bluffing. Richard Yates, Lincoln’s Illinois
political ally, laughed-off Southern threats of secession and civil war as mere stereotypical
Southern bluster. “We are told that the South will not submit and that the Union is to be
dissolved,” Yates said. “Do you want my advice on this subject? Then all I have to say is, keep
cool. […] I confess I have but little fears of secession or disunion. […] We believe it will not be
one year till the whole South, except the traitors bent on disunion… will hail the election of Mr.

Lincoln as one of the greatest blessings.” Why compromise when you don’t believe there will be
any penalty for remaining unmoved?
Even Lincoln, who was ready to go so far as to offer guarantees to the Southern states for slavery
within their own boundaries, drew the line at allowing slavery to be legalized in the western
territories. “Let there be no compromise on slavery extension,” Lincoln wrote. And if
Southerners thought their solution lay in seceding from the Union, then “My opinion is that no
state can, in any way lawfully, get out of the Union, without the consent of the others; and that it
is the duty of the President, and other government functionaries to run the machine as it is.” But
Lincoln likewise dismissed the possibility that the secession crisis would come to war. “There is
really no crisis except an artificial one!” he said in a speech on February 15, 1861. “There is no
crisis, excepting such a one as may be gotten up at any time by designing politicians.”
Randall and Nevins were wrong to attribute the “inability to compromise” to “blundering.” Both
sides in 1861 were actually driven by the most glittering, hard-edged logic. But logic can be just
as uncompromising as stupidity, and in this case it provided a lethal formula in which both sides
refused compromise and then dismissed any need for compromise. Four years later, in his second
Inaugural Address, Lincoln acknowledged the hardness of that logic (and in precisely the terms
Kelly used about the “lack of an ability to compromise”) when he said, “Both parties deprecated
war, but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would
accept war rather than let it perish, and the war came.”
Nor was Kelly stretching points by describing Robert E. Lee as “an honorable man.” Honorable
men are sometimes called upon to serve bad causes, something both Lee and Ulysses Grant
experienced while serving in the U.S. Army during the Mexican-American War. “To this day,”
Grant wrote in 1885, he regarded the Mexican conflict as “one of the most unjust ever waged by
a stronger against a weaker nation,” and Lee agreed, saying that, “It is true we bullied” Mexico.
“Of that I am ashamed, as She was the weaker party.”
Grant’s own opinion of Lee ratifies Kelly’s. At Appomattox, Grant “felt like anything rather than
rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so
much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever
fought, and one for which there was the least excuse.” Even then, Grant did “not question… the
sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.” In fact, not even Winston
Churchill, as World War II raged, would withhold a word of praise to an honorable opponent in
the German army, Erwin Rommel: “We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us, and,
may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.”
I may, in some respects, actually be less forgiving than Grant, in that I think Lee’s decision to
serve the Confederacy was at least treasonous, if not an act of treason. (It is odd that the New
York Times did not seem to regard treason worth complaining about.) But Kelly was right to
observe that there were legal and constitutional questions that complicate that judgment, and
which prevented Lee from actually being tried for treason after the war. The most significant of
these, as Lee himself pointed out before a congressional committee in 1866, was the uncertain
constitutional relationship between state and national citizenship. “The act of Virginia, in

withdrawing herself from the United States, carried me along as a citizen of Virginia,” Lee
insisted, “her laws and her acts were binding on me.”
That is hardly unreasonable. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution was
maddeningly vague on the relationship between national and state citizenship, and the obligation
to respect the “privileges and immunities” they entailed. Whatever distaste I feel for Lee’s cause,
no one was ever able to accuse him of ordering wartime atrocities. Others did order them, but not
Lee. Even Lincoln, who wished in 1863 that he had had authority to arrest Lee before Lee could
join the Confederacy, acknowledged in 1865, when shown a photograph of Lee, that: “It is a
good face; it is the face of a noble, noble, brave man.”
“The past is a foreign country,” wrote the British novelist L.P. Hartley, “they do things
differently there.” It is also a complicated country, and it doesn’t pay to rush through its
landscape, looking for quick gotcha! moments. John Kelly may not be an historian, but he has
been a good and honorable soldier. He knew another honorable soldier when he saw him, even at
a distance.
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